This paper examines the making of UK monetary policy between 1997 and 2007 using an analysis of voting behaviour in the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).
Introduction 4
On 11 January 2007 the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England increased the interest rate by a quarter of a percent to 5.25 percent. The increase came as a surprise to most observers given the economic conditions and past behaviour of the MPC.
When the minutes were published three weeks later, it was revealed that the committee had split 5 to 4 in favour of the increase. In fact, the MPC has been divided about two-thirds of the time since the Bank of England was made independent in 1997, although rarely split down the middle as in January 2007. Presented with the same information about the state of the British economy each month, why do the members of the MPC disagree on the appropriate interest rate? Clearly, British central bankers, like all policymakers, do not all think the same way. This suggests that had the composition of the MPC been slightly different in January 2007, the decision might have been to hold rates rather than increase them.
What we do in this paper is undertake a 'spatial analysis' of voting in the MPC between the first meeting of the committee after the Bank of England was made independent in June 1997 and the end of the tenure of Gordon Brown as Chancellor of the Exchequer ten years later, in June 2007. Unlike existing research on voting in the MPC, we use a Bayesian estimation technique to derive 'ideal point estimates' of the location of the 25 people who were members of the MPC at one time or another in this ten year period. This method provides estimates of where the MPC members are located on what might be called a 'dovehawk' (or 'ease-tightness') dimension of interest rate policy. These estimates are more robust to changes to the effects of making decisions under particular economic conditions than more commonly used 'batting average' methods of estimating the preferences of the MPC members. This method also produces uncertainty estimates around the locations of the MPC members.
In the next section we discuss how to understand voting behaviour in the MPC in particular, and voting in central banks and other decision-making settings (such as courts and parliaments) more generally. We also present the Bayesian technique we use to estimate the ideal points of the MPC members. These estimates are presented in section three. In section four we then use the estimated ideal points to investigate whether there is a conflict pattern revealed in the voting decisions by the members of the MPC.
Understanding and Measuring Voting Behaviour in the MPC
One of the first acts of the newly elected Labour government in May 1997 was to grant operational independence for setting interest rates to the Bank of England. After almost two decades in opposition the new Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, was eager to demonstrate his commitment to economic stability. Central bank independence is seen as an effective institutional arrangement for delivering a stable monetary policy as it prevents the government from using interest rates to boost the economy prior to elections (Drazen 2000) . Granting independence to the Bank of England hence sent a strong signal to the electorate and the markets that Labour could be trusted to manage the economy.
The act of parliament which established central bank independence in the UK provided for the Chancellor to set an annual inflation target and for a Monetary Policy Committee to meet every month to decide the interest rate in order to meet the Chancellor's target. This inflation target is currently set at 2 percent, plus or minus 1 percent.
The MPC consists of nine members: five 'internal' members from the staff of the Bank of England and four 'external' members appointed by the Chancellor. The Governor and the two Deputy Governors of the MPC are appointed for renewable 5-years terms by the Crown, which effectively means the Chancellor. The two other internal members, the Executive Directors of the Bank, are appointed for renewable 3-year terms by the Governor of the Bank of England, after consultation with the Chancellor. The four external members are appointed for renewable 3-year terms. Members are required to go before the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee. The Committee can take a vote on the nominee, but does not have the power to veto a Chancellor's appointee.
5 Thus the government, and particularly the Chancellor, would appear to possess a great deal of control over the appointment of most MPC members. [ Table 1 About Here]
Given the set up of the MPC, with one individual wielding considerable power of appointment, given the collective aim of meeting an inflation target set externally, and given the fact that each month the members of the MPC are presented with the same information about the state of the economy, one might assume that it would be relatively easy for the members of the committee to reach agreement. However, several factors ensure that this is not in fact the case. Members of the MPC may disagree either because they have different underlying economic preferences or because they hold different beliefs about the true state of the economy.
Where underlying economic preferences are concerned, members could prefer different absolute levels of inflation because they trade-off short-term inflation and unemployment in different ways (Hibbs 1977; Alesina and Sachs 1988) . For example, the same rate of inflation will affect different sectors of the economy in different ways. So, if one central banker cares more about manufacturing while another cares more about financial services, these two members might have different preferences over inflation given the same economic conditions. One could argue that with a collective inflation target set externally, the MPC members are unlikely to be able to explicitly reveal their different preferred inflation rates. They collectively have an incentive to preserve the reputation of the Bank, which is diminished if the Bank repeatedly misses the inflation target. However, the sanctions for missing the target are relatively weak -the Governor of the Bank of England has to write a letter to the Chancellor explaining why the target has been missed. Furthermore, the inflation target takes the form of a symmetric range of inflation rates. As a result, there is some room for variance in preferences over inflation. For example, some members may prefer to overshoot the target than undershoot the target while others might prefer the opposite.
Even if the members of the central bank have the same underlying economic preferences, they may vote differently on an interest rate decision because they hold differing beliefs about the true state of the economy (Blinder 2007 (Downs 1957; Hinich and Munger 1997) . The power of the basic spatial model comes from its simplicity and generalisability. The model assumes a policy space within which all policy alternatives can be placed according to some underlying dimension (or several dimensions). Actors have preferences over the location of the policies on this dimension and they maximise their utility by voting for the alternative closest to their most preferred location on the dimension (their ideal point).
A one dimensional version of this scenario is illustrated in Figure 1 . Legislators l, c and r have ideal-points l, c and r, respectively. They consider how to vote on proposal f, g and h. Let β(f) , β(g) and β(h) denote the cutpoints (or mid-points) between the status quo policy and proposals f, g and h, respectively. For example, β(f) separates those legislators for whom proposal f yields a higher utility than the status quo from those legislators for whom the status quo yields a higher utility than proposal f. We see that β(f) is very close to the ideal point of legislator c. She is nearly indifferent between the status quo and the proposal.
Legislator r votes against legislator l on this proposal. Proposal g pits legislator r against l and c. All legislators vote the same way on proposal h. As it stands, the model is only identified up to scale. To fully identify the model it is necessary to specify the direction of the scale and the metric. This can be done by constraining the location of one more legislator or proposal than there are dimensions, or by normalizing the distribution to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one and fixing the directionality of the policy space.
[ Figure 1 About Here]
Based on these basic ideas, the statistical estimation of the spatial model has developed substantively in recent years. For example, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) The Bayesian estimation technique that we use here builds on a standard item response model which assumes that actors have preferences over the policy outcome, in our case the optimal interest rate level given the economic conditions. However, some members of the MPC, for example Buiter, often differed from the majority not over the direction of change in the interest rate, but also on the size of such a change. We hence followed the suggestion in Bafumi et al (2005) and estimated the error-rates δ from the data. We follow the parameterization of Martin and Quinn (2006:26) . Let member i of the committee have an ideal point on the 'hawk-dove' dimension defined as θ i , let the location of the proposed interest rate j be α j and the 'discrimination parameter' be β j . The probability π that member i supports the proposal j is then assumed to be:
For the members' ideal points, we assume independent normal priors for most members, but draw on substantive prior information to restrict θ Wadhwani to be negative and θ Besley , θ Sentance and θ Large to be positive. 6 These restrictions help to identify the directionality of the model. Wadhwani has a track-record of consistently voting for lower interest rates than the majority of the committee. It is hence unproblematic to restrict his prior to be negative.
Large is known as the most hawkish of the internal members so restricting his prior to be positive is likewise unproblematic. Besley and Sentance have, since joining the bank in the autumn of 2006, consistently favoured higher interest rates than most of the other members of the committee. As the model does not rely on pre-coding the directionality of the votes, fixing these two members to have a positive prior helps to identify the directionality of the votes where Besley and Sentance are in the minority. We do not force any of these members to be the most extreme at either end of the scale, nor do we force the latter three to have identical ideal points.
As unanimous voting decisions of the MPC do not provide any information about differences between the committee members, 42 of the 125 decisions are dropped. This means that the analysis is based upon individual voting decisions by 25 members in a total of 83 meetings where at least one member dissented from the adopted decision. The data are taken from the minutes of the meetings released by the Bank of England. 7 If a decision is split two ways, where some members dissent in favour of higher interest rates than the majority position while other members dissent in favour of lower interest rates than the majority, the decision is coded as two separate votes. One vote is then the majority proposal against the lower alternative and the other vote is the majority position against the higher alternative. We assume that somebody who supports lower interest rates than the majority in the former vote opposes higher interest rates than the majority in the latter vote in the same meeting.
The sceptical reader may at this point think that we are stacking the deck by using informative priors. The reason for using these priors and the additional δ term is that 42 of the remaining 83 votes only have one member opposing the majority view. As the directionality of these votes are parameters to be jointly estimated with the location of the members and the discrimination parameter of each vote, the standard approach ends up placing Besley and Sentance next to Wadhwani and Julius. However, if the 42 votes with only one member in the minority are excluded, and no other constraints are put on any of the parameters, the results are very similar to the results we end up with using the outlier-resistant approach and all votes (the results of the estimates from these models are presented in Figure   A1 in the appendix.). Thus the outlier-resistant approach strikes us as more sensible than throwing away half of all the data-points. This is a clear example of the outlier problems in ideal point estimation in small committees (see Bafumi et al. 2005 ) .
We let the sampler run for 2 million iterations. The first 1 million iterations were discarded and the chain was heavily thinned to prevent autocorrelation between the observations. The presented results are summaries from 1,000 samples from the posterior distribution. The model is estimated using the MCMCirtKdRob function in the MCMCpack library in R (Martin & Quinn 2006) . The Geweke plots, traceplots and autocorrelation plots are included in the appendix (see Gelman et al. 2003 for a description of these diagnostic tools). The Geweke statistics indicates that the samples are drawn from a stationary distribution. The traceplots do not display any trend in the samples. There is virtually no autocorrelation.
Ideal Point Estimates of MPC Members
The ideal point estimates for each MPC member and the associated uncertainties around these points are presented in Figure 2 . The point indicates the median estimate. The thick line contains the central tendency (or the 50 percent credibility interval) of the estimate, while the thin line provides the 95 percent credibility interval. The numerical estimates are presented in Table A1 in the appendix. Furthermore, as one might expect, the internal members tend to be clustered in the centrist group. Interestingly, though, the externally appointed members are found in both the group of hawks, the doves and amongst the centrist group. As a result, it is not correct to assume that externally appointed members vote in a particular way. However, the results do suggest that externally appointed members are more likely to vote against the majority on the committee than internal members (cf. Spencer, 2007) . This suggests that the Chancellor might be able to influence the balance on the committee by appointing external members with particular preferences relative to the centrist group. More on this later.
In the meantime, as a validity check, we compare our results with two alternative ways of measuring the preferences of the MPC members that a commonly used by the media and MPC watchers. The first is a simple 'batting average' score, where members are ranked according to the proportion of times they voted for an increase in interest rates. The second is a measure which is commonly used by The Financial Times and other publications (e.g.
Edmunds 1999
). This measure is calculated by assigning scores for each vote of each member, where a member scores 1 if he or she voted with the majority, 2 if he or she voted for a higher interest rate than the majority and 0 if he or she voted for a lower interest rate than the majority. An average of these scores is then calculated for each member across all of his or her votes.
The estimates from our Bayesian ideal point model compared to these 'batting average' and 'Financial Times' scores are illustrated in Figure 3 . The first thing to note is the relatively high correlation between our estimates and both these types of measures -as shown by the clustering of most of the MPC members along the two regression lines. In other words, our method clearly passes the face validity test.
The figures nevertheless highlight some important differences between our estimates and the two more commonly used methods. The main problem with the batting average method is that it does not take account of the behaviour of the other committee members at the time a decision is taken. This is most clearly illustrated by the case of Davies, who only participated in two meetings, yet voted to raise rates in both meetings and hence has a maximum value on the batting average scale. However, every other member of the committee voted exactly the same way as Davies in these two meetings. Hence, it is impossible to tell his preferences apart from any of the other members of the committee at that time -which is exactly why there are very large confidence intervals around our estimates of his position.
[ Figure 3 About Here]
The FT method, in this regard, is an improvement on the batting average method, as it takes into account the behaviour of the majority in the committee at the time of a decision.
Nevertheless, both the batting average measure and the FT measure tend to give extreme scores for members who participated in very few meetings. We see for example that Sentence and Besley, who have only participated in few meetings, are measured as the most hawkish members of the MPC by both these methods. We also place these members towards the hawkish end of the scale, but there simply is not enough information in their votes to warrant locating them at such an extreme position. This demonstrates that the two most common existing ways of locating MPC members may invite the observer to conclude that any two individuals differ in their preferences when the difference between their estimated ideal points may in fact be well within the margin of error given the available data.
Another disadvantage with the batting average measure is that it fails to take account of the economic conditions at the time of each vote. If a member's time on the committee happens to coincide with a period when there is pressure on the Bank to raise interest rates, he or she will tend to be located towards the hawkish end of the scale -as is the case with Besley and Sentence. Conversely, if the majority of a member's time on the committee happens to coincide with a period when there is pressure on the Bank to cut interest rates, he or she will tend to be located towards the dovish end of the scale -as is the case with Allsopp, who we locate in a much less extreme (albeit still relatively dovish) position than does the batting average measure.
Again, the FT method improves on this because it measures whether each vote is part of the majority or the minority. To the extent that the majority view on the MPC tends to reflect economic conditions, it provides a crude control for economic conditions: that is, a dissent vote implies that an individual prefers lower or higher rates relative to the majority of members, given economic circumstances.
But our method improves on the FT measure in this regard also. For example, our method locates Allsopp in a less extreme position than the FT measure; which locates Allsopp as almost as dovish as Wadhwani. The close proximity of Wadhwani and Allsopp in the FT's scores is due to the fact that, over the course of their respective terms on the MPC, they had a similar proportion of dissenting votes in favour of lower rates (13 out of 37 for Wadhwani and 12 out of 37 for Allsopp), while neither dissented in favour of higher rates. However, these simple summaries, which drive the FT scores, do not reflect the fact that, during the period when Wadhwani and Allsopp were simultaneously on the committee (between June 2000 and May 2002), Allsopp voted for higher rates than Wadhwani on eight occasions while Wadhwani never voted for lower rates than Allsopp. Because our method measures members' votes relative to those of each other individual member (rather than relative to the majority), it picks up these differences and hence estimates Allsopp as much more moderate than Wadhwani. In other words, our measure picks up the fact that, given the same economic circumstances in the same meetings, Allsopp voted for higher rates than Wadhwani eight times, whereas the FT measure does not.
Appointments as a Monetary Policy Tool
With these estimates of the relative location of the MPC members, we can investigate whether there is a pattern in the in the relative strength of dovish, centrist and hawkish groups on the committee over time.
There are several reasons why we might expect such a pattern to exist. First, a newly independent central bank may wish to establish a credible reputation for being a strongly inflation-averse institution (Drazen 2000) . Internal members may hence wish to pursue a policy at the more conservative end of the growth-inflation spectrum, preferring to keep inflation low, even at the risk of hampering growth. The government may in turn wish to limit this tendency by appointing more liberal external members who do not share the longterm institutional interest of the bank.
Second, the logic of the classic political business cycle would predict that the Chancellor would have wanted to use his appointment powers to engineer favourable economic conditions prior to elections (Nordhaus 1975) . Translating the logic of Nordhaus's theory into the context of central bank appointments, we might expect the Chancellor to attempt to bias the MPC in a dovish direction in the 18 months before a general election, so that a comparatively easier monetary policy stimulates (or at least does not restrict) the economy prior to the election.
Monetary policy is, of course, not the only policy tool for managing the economy.
The Chancellor also has direct control over fiscal policy. Thus, the political business cycle theory can be adapted to allow for an interaction between the Labour government's fiscal policy and the revealed position of the new members of the committee. To elaborate, in the 1997 election Labour pledged that during its first two years in office it would not increase public spending beyond the levels planned by the previous Conservative government. The circumstances. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the Chancellor had probabilistic beliefs regarding the preferences of potential appointees. These beliefs, based upon past academic work by the individual, their career background and also information gathered via mutual acquaintances, can be thought of as probability distributions along the dove-hawk scale for each appointee, some relatively wide (indicating high uncertainty regarding preferences), some narrower (indicating less uncertainty regarding preferences). In the case of an extreme lack of information regarding a candidate, one could think of a normal probability distribution with mean zero and large variance.
Even allowing for uncertainty regarding the preferences of new appointees, the Chancellor would have been able to observe the voting behaviour of existing MPC members and utilise this information when deciding whether to re-appoint someone. It may have been the case that, if an existing member had revealed themselves to be relatively hawkish, then a
Chancellor seeking a dovish bias on the MPC may have had an incentive to 'gamble' on a new appointee about whom he had relatively little information.
We investigate to what extent there is evidence in the data to support these predictions.
To do this, we calculate the probability that each new member of the committee behaves in a more hawkish manner than his or her predecessor. A probability of over 0.5 indicates that the new member is more hawkish. A probability of under 0.5 indicates that the new member behaves in a more dovish manner than his or her predecessor. These probabilities are presented in Table 2 . The table does not include those individuals who were original members of the MPC in June 1997 (George, King, Buiter, Goodhart, Plenderleith and Davies), or who were appointed in the months thereafter to fill hitherto empty positions on the committee (Julius, Budd and Vickers).
[ Table 2 About Here]
The first general pattern observable from this table is that, as predicted by the political business cycle logic above, in the run-up to the June 2001 general election, new appointees tended to be more dovish than the members they replaced. This trend is particularly pronounced in the cases of Wadhwani's and Allsopp's appointments. Wadhwani replaced the relatively hawkish Budd, who had only served on the committee for a shortened two-year term, in June 1999, two years before the general election. According to our ideal point estimates the posterior probability that Wadhwani is more hawkish than Budd is lower than 0.1 percent. At the same, the Chancellor opted to re-appoint the executive director,
Plenderleith, who appears to be relatively dovish compared to Budd.
Allsopp replaced Goodhart in June 2000, eleven months before the general election.
Interestingly, Goodhart, relatively centrist on our dove-hawk scale, stated publicly at the time that he had expressed an interest in serving a second term (Beattie, 2000) . Despite this, the Chancellor chose instead to replace him with Allsopp who, according to our ideal point estimates, has a posterior probability of less than 1 percent of being more hawkish than Goodhart. Furthermore, newspaper reports at the time of Allsopp's appointment suggested that he was expected to be a dove by analysts (Thornton, 2000) . The Chancellor is unlikely to have been unaware of these expectations.
Furthermore, in addition to these stand-out cases, almost every replacement made by the Chancellor during Labour's first term involved the appointment of an individual who, according to our estimates, was more likely than not to act in a more dovish manner than his or her predecessor. Indeed, excluding Clementi, who was appointed in the first few months of Labour's first term, every appointee during this period has at most a 15 percent chance of being more hawkish than his or her predecessor. The result of this appointment policy was For example, although Gieve appears to be more of a dove than his predecessor Large (the posterior probability that Gieve is more hawkish than Large is lower than 10 percent), Large was known to be the most hawkish of the internal members of the committee and Gieve is by no means a dove. In fact, Gieve is also placed in the centre-right region of the dove-hawk scale in Figure 2 . More generally, George, Lambert and Walton, who are all estimated to have ideal points in the centre or centre-right right region of the dove-hawk scale, were replaced as MPC members by Lomax, Besley and Sentance, respectively, who are all also estimated to be at the centre-right of the scale. Similarly, Nickell and Bell, who are estimated to be at the centre-left of the spectrum, were replaced by Walton and Blanchflower respectively, who both also have ideal points in this region.
[ Figure 4 About Here]
The effect of the replacements on the location of the median and mean voter inside the committee is illustrated in Figure 4 . The figure clearly shows that the appointment policy led to significant variation over time in the location of the average member of the committee, whether measured by the location of the mean or the median member. The difference is largest for the mean estimates, as this measure is most affected by outliers. Nevertheless, the trend for both estimators is the same: the Committee became more dovish during the first term of the new Labour government, and then became more hawkish after the re-election of the government in 2001.
Although the median voter theorem has dominated thinking about committee decisionmaking for decades (Black 1958 , Downs 1957 , recent research suggests the location of the mean voter may be better prediction of the outcome of decision-making in small committees.
The mean voter theorem corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution and as such may provide a better approximation of bargaining in small committees (Achen 2006) . To the extent that the mean voter theorem approximates decision-making in the MPC better than the median voter theorem, it is likely that the appointment policy had an influence on the level of interest rate set by the Bank of England both before and after the 2001 elections.
This then relates to the other function in Figure 4 : the level of British public expenditure as a percentage of GDP. This captures the public spending plans of the Chancellor relative to the make-up of the MPC. We see that the level of expenditure is at its lowest when doves are appointed to the committee. As the public expenditure starts to increase, hawks start to replace doves in the committee. This pattern may simply be coincidence! However, this pattern is also consistent with the mixed macro-economic policy incentives of the Chancellor: to pursue a less constrained monetary policy during a period when public spending is constrained (during the first Labour term), and then to pursue a tighter monetary policy after the initial spending constraints are been lifted (after Labour's reelection in 2001).
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Note: The top part of the figure shows the estimates from all votes. In the lower part, decisions with only 1 opposing member are taken out. 
